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표지이미지
자료유형 : 단행본
서명 / 저자 : (a toolbox for) Economic Design / Dimitrios Diamantaras, with Emina I. Cardamone, Karen A. Campbell, Scott Deacle, and Lisa A. Delgado
개인저자 : Diamantaras, Dimitrios |
발행사항 : New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009
형태사항 : x, 292 p. : ill ; 24cm.
서지주기 : Includes bibliographical references (p. 278-287) and index
주제명 : Economics
Economic policy
Economic theory
ISBN : 9780230610606
청구기호 : HB131 D53e
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I. Introduction
1 A Story from Ancient Athens
2 Institutions and Economics
3 Getting the Big Picture
4 Example: An Auction
5 A Taste of Social Choice Theory
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
6 Social Choice Functions
7 Economic Domain
Exchange Economies
Social Choice Correspondences on the Exchange Economy Domain
The Pareto Social Choice Correspondence
The Individually Rational Social Choice Correspondence
The Core Social Choice Correspondence
The No-Envy Social Choice Correspondence
Combinations of the previous Social Choice Correspondences
The Walrasian Social Choice Correspondence
8 Quasilinear Preferences and Their Uses
9 Appendix: Proofs
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
10 Exercises

II. Dominant Strategy Implementation
1 Definitions
2 Revelation Principle
3 Restricting Domains: Single-Peaked Preferences
4 Restricted Domains: Quasilinear Domains and Groves Mechanisms
Balance Problem
Voluntary Participation Problem
5 The Vickrey Auction
6 Exercises

III. Implementation in Nash Equilibria: A Lot of Information Assumed
1 A Quick Lesson on Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
2 Nash Equilibrium in Implementation
Strategy Space Reduction
3 Two Person Cases
4 Exercises

IV. Bayesian Equilibrium and Mechanisms
1 Preliminary: How to Represent Information
2 Bayesian Equilibrium
3 The Bayesian Revelation Principle
4 The Mechanism of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet and of Arrow
Voluntary Participation
5 Optimal Auctions
6 Bilateral Trading
7 Exercises

V. Refined Nash Implementation
1 Implementation in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Subgame Perfect Implementation in Quasilinear Environments
2 Implementation using Undominated Strategies
3 Double Implementation
Definitions
Ratio Correspondence
4 Virtual Nash Implementation

VI. Applications
1 Manipulation-Resistant Online Reputation Systems
2 Walrasian Implementation via Market Games
3 Implementing the Lindahl Social Choice Correspondence
4 Implementing Fair
5 Allocations Application to Negative Externality Problems: Pollution Abatement
6 A Nearly Efficient Mutual Insurance Mechanism
7 Financing the Athenian Fleet

VII. Bayesian Implementation
1 Example of Multiple Bayesian Equilibria
2 Bayesian Implementation and Bayesian Monotonicity
Resrictiveness of Bayesian Monotonicity
3 Virtual Bayesian Implementation

VIII. Further Topics in Mechanism Design
1 Endogenous Mechanisms
Notation and Definitions
An Application: Public Goods
Positive Results for Endogenous Games with 3 or More Players
2 Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
Notation and Definitions
Results
3 Robust Mechanism Design
Notation and Definitions
Results
4 The Limits of Ex Post Implementation
Notation and a Result
An Illustration of the Geometric Condition
5 Exercises

VIIII. Matching Models: Theory and Applications 203
1 What is Matching?
Notation and Definitions
2 Two-Sided Matching
One-to-One Matching
Many-to-One Matching
3 One-Sided Matching
The Shapley and Scarf House Market
House Allocation Problems
The Kidney Exchange Problem
4 Exercises

X. Empirical Evidence on Mechanisms
1 Introduction
2 Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms for Public Goods
3 Tests of Incentive Compatibility
4 Research on Mechanism Dynamics
5 Tests of Implementation Concepts
6 Applied Economic Design: Notes from the Field
7 Conclusion

A. Mathematics Review and More on Economic Domains
A.1 Sets, Correspondences, Functions, Intervals
A.2 Derivatives and Related Notation
A.3 Elements of Mathematical Optimization
A.4 Envelope Theorem
A.5 The Edgeworth
A.6 Box Public Good Economies
The Simplest Public Project Model
Public Goods Models
Social Choice Correspondences on Public Good Economy Domains
Pareto Social Choice Correspondence
Lindahl and Constrained Lindahl Social Choice Correspondences
Ratio Social Choice Correspondence
A.7 Exercises

Notation
Bibliography
Index

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